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Greenhouse gas removal (GGR) raises many cultural, ethical, legal, social, and political
issues, yet in the growing area of GGR research, humanities and social sciences (HASS)
research is often marginalized, constrained and depoliticised. This global dynamic is
illustrated by an analysis of the UK GGR research programme. This dynamic matters
for the knowledge produced and for its users. Without HASS contributions, too
narrow a range of perspectives, futures and issues will be considered, undermining or
overpromising the prospects for the responsible development of GGR (and threatening
worse side-effects), and limiting our understanding of why and how policy demands GGR
solutions in the first place. In response, we present policy principles for bringing HASS
fully into GGR research, organized around three themes: (1) HASS-led GGR research,
(2) Opening up GGR futures, and (3) The politics of GGR futures.
Keywords: humanities and social sciences, GGR research, marginalized, constrained, depoliticised, UK GGR
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INTRODUCTION
Greenhouse gas removal (GGR) techniques hold out the promise of removing GHGs from
the atmosphere, at globally significant scales. GGR techniques are typically envisioned to have
two explicit, inter-related roles in future climate policy. Firstly, to compensate for emissions
that are especially hard to mitigate, e.g., some emissions from aviation and agriculture.
Secondly, to subsequently reverse any “overshoot” of cumulative emissions above a safe limit
(Royal Society, 2018).
The promise of future use of GGR techniques features in all the scenarios that underpin the
Paris Agreement (Minx et al., 2018), having previously been increasingly adopted by modelers
developing pathways to limit global warming to 2 or 1.5◦C (Fuss et al., 2014; Beck and Mahony,
2018). Recently, several countries have committed to net-zero climate emission targets, for example,
the UK and France by 2050, Sweden by 2045, Finland by 2035 and Norway by 2030, to be realized
in part through GGR deployment or international offsetting (Darby, 2019; UK Government, 2019).
Some GGR techniques, such as afforestation, are in use, mainly for other purposes than climate
mitigation, and far from at the scale envisioned in relation to current climate policy; others, such
as direct air capture with carbon storage, are yet to be developed. There are large uncertainties
and/or intense contestation as to their future use at scale, in terms of cost, effectiveness, resource
availability, incentivisation, justice implications and acceptability among other aspects (Fuss et al.,
2018; Minx et al., 2018; Nemet et al., 2018). The origin and form of policy demand for GGR has
also come under scrutiny. Several authors have pointed out that betting on future GGR use is risky
(Fuss et al., 2014) and also risks permitting a slower pace of emissions reductions in the short term
(Anderson and Peters, 2016; McLaren, 2016; Markusson et al., 2017).
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GGR brings together researchers from several pre-existing
research communities, includingmodeling (Laude, 2019), carbon
capture and storage (CCS), and land use (Minx et al., 2018). Minx
et al. (2018) show that there are distinct and diversifying research
fields mapping onto specific techniques, but at the same time
increasing connectivity (shared references) indicating emerging
common discourses. Some initial dedicated government funding
(notably the UK GGR programme, £8.6m, 2017-2021) has
also appeared in the last few years, and the first international
conferences (“Negative CO2 emissions” in Gothenburg, and
“Negative Emissions: Integrating Industry, Technology and
Society for Carbon Drawdown” in Canberra, both in 2018) have
taken place. There is a risk that this emerging institutionalization
locks-in problematic tendencies discussed below, unless action
is taken. In this paper we argue that, to date, humanities and
social sciences (HASS) research on GGR has been marginalized,
constrained and depoliticised—like much other climate research
(Hulme, 2011) and set out principles for integrating HASS into
GGR research.
FROM CONTENTIOUS CLIMATE
GEOENGINEERING TO INSTRUMENTAL
GGR RESEARCH
The notion of GGR (alongside similar concepts like Negative
Emissions Techniques, NETs, and Carbon Dioxide Removal,
CDR) used to be seen, alongside solar radiation management
(SRM), as one of two kinds of climate geoengineering
(Royal Society, 2009). But recently, GGR is more often
being presented and constituted as a research field in its
own right. The IPCC’s 5th assessment report (2014) made a
distinction between GGR (specifically CO2 removal, primarily
bioenergy with CCS, BECCS) and SRM. Many models and
scenarios included in the report used GGR to reach a
2◦C target, some even at rates exceeding 20 Gt CO2/year
(see e.g., p1315), whereas the report enumerated the many
risks of SRM (WGII Section 19.5.4) and excluded it from
the scenarios. By the time of the IPCC Special Report
on 1.5◦C warming (2018), GGR was presented as entirely
separate1.
Despite heavily featuring modeling work, climate
geoengineering research has stimulated a wide range of HASS
contributions. For example, in the UK, the ESRC/AHRC funded
project on Climate Geoengineering Governance, encompassed
social science and humanities, including philosophy and law.
This allowed for exploration of diverse issues such as problems
of lock-in and path-dependence, and the impact of Confucian
ethics on the social distribution of responsibility for climate
change (Healey and Rayner, 2015). Among inspirations was the
responsible research and innovation framework, emphasizing
1The emerging distinction between GGR and SRM reflects differential uptake
in climate policy discourse, rather than wholly distinct ethical and political
issues, as both sets of techniques are responses to excess emissions. It is often
said that climate geoengineering, and especially solar radiation management, is
intrinsically more provocative than GGR, but what is and isn’t controversial is not
predetermined, and should not be decided a priori.
anticipation, reflexivity, inclusion and responsiveness, in earlier
HASS geoengineering research (Stilgoe, 2015). From contrast,
the emerging GGR field has a rather narrow range of HASS
contributions, focusing heavily on instrumental questions of
cost-efficient deployment modeling and public acceptance, more
akin to CCS research (Markusson et al., 2012; Waller et al.,
2020).
Whilst climate geoengineering research developed at arm’s
length to policy, the separate GGR research field is emerging
in close interaction with climate policy making, and policy-
oriented climate modeling, with consequences for how the field
is constituted, what disciplines are included and how. Like
policy-oriented climate change research generally (Hulme, 2011),
a narrow, instrumental, techno-economic framing dominates,
oriented toward answering the question: “GGR will be needed,
how do we make it happen?”, and approached through economic
optimisation of anticipated GGR deployment as compensation
for recalcitrant emissions and emissions overshoot (McLaren,
2020). Beyond that techno-economic core, the language is one
of risks and co-benefits (mainly environmental, but sometimes
also social, political etc.). Out of more than 130 papers presented
at the Gothenburg conference2, about 25% were purely technical
studies, and about 40% were techno-economic studies, generally
focused narrowly on cost implications (and led by engineers
rather than economists). Less than 25% of contributions were
from social scientists or economists, and very few from
humanities researchers. At the Canberra conference3 roughly 10
of the 30 presentations were socio-economic contributions. The
UK GGR programme is dominated by the natural sciences (here
including physical, environmental and engineering sciences),
reflecting the call specifications of the funders (NERC, 2016).
Whilst about 40%4 of the participating researchers are social
scientists in the broadest sense, approximately half of whom
are economists, ten out of eleven projects (incl. all four larger
consortia) are led by natural scientists. Humanities scholars are
largely absent.
The UK GGR programme is also strongly focussed on policy
makers as an audience. The research agenda is designed by and
for them to underpin envisioned GGR deployment, and as a
result tends toward the narrowly instrumental. The immediate
UK GGR policy context contains the roots of the problem. For
example, a prominent report (Royal Society, 2018) set out the
technical potential of a set of GGR techniques, and has been
influential on subsequent research policy. It deals somewhat
with economic, legal and social issues, but overall the social
dimension is reduced to one of limited public acceptability
and understanding; the social understood as a mere barrier for
deployment, and approached according to a long-discredited
knowledge deficit theory (Wynne, 1991; Sturgis and Allum,
2004). Social science is not entirely “sequestered” and out of sight,
2http://negativeco2emissions2018.com/programme/
3https://negativeemissionsconference2018.wordpress.com/science-programme/
4We calculated this using a list of participating researchers at Programme start in
2017, and classified them by broad discipline using information available online.
Note that this is a head count, rather than full time equivalents. It also does not
readily translate into a quantitative share of funding dedicated to social science
inquiry.
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but given a very narrow role. This analysis draws heavily on the
UK case, and whilst supported by the international conference
data, there may also be differences among countries’ emergent
GGR policies.
WHY DOES IT MATTER?
Crucially, the work of social scientists tends toward particular
roles and topics. Mapping5 of the social science across the
UK GGR programme shows that whilst the methods and the
conceptual lenses applied vary, and there is some room for
interpretative and critical social science (e.g. Markusson et al.,
2018; McLaren et al., 2019; Waller et al., 2020; Pozo et al., in
press), the problems to address are predominantly seen through
a narrow, instrumental frame: as drivers and barriers. For
economists, the main focus is on costs; for other social scientists,
public perceptions and acceptance. More specifically, we identify
three main problems:
(1) Calls to integrate knowledge using one narrow techno-
economic framing seriously constrain what counts as relevant
social science, and tend toward placing social scientists
in marginal service roles, for example responsible for
devising ways to predict or control public responses to GGR
technologies. The roles of HASS GGR researchers should
not just be providers of data on public acceptability to help
construct new models or scenarios, nor be communicators of
physical science results to lay publics or policy makers.
Scientists involved in the UK programme identified3 as
a challenge for their work precisely the need to integrate
social science research with modeling and life-cycle analysis
(LCA). This is unsurprising given differences regarding both
epistemology (what counts as knowledge, e.g., qualitative
methods) and ontology (what aspects of reality matter, e.g.,
power relations).
(2) The instrumental, techno-economic frame is too constrained,
even when it comes to analyzing social dimensions of GGR
deployment futures:
(2a) The dominating directions of GGR research do not
reflect the urgency with which the techniques would need
to be scaled up (Laude, 2019; Nemet et al., 2018), since
they omit many cultural, political, etc. dimensions of
plausible future “real world” application contexts, and
so also narrow down what futures are considered. Such
thin techno-economic accounts are complemented with
HASS research that tends to get stuck on a limited set of
questions including whether lay publics will understand
and accept the visions of experts. For example, Lenzi
et al. (2018) point out that despite the professed need
for a massive rollout of GGR and the many value-laden
5We draw here on mapping of the social science research across the GGR
programme, and documented discussions at two workshops for participants –
aimed primarily at HASS researchers, but with a wider attendance – in the
programme, organized by the two first authors of this paper. A published
report from the first workshop is available here: https://www.upgreenlca.eu/assets/
GGRT_SocioEconWorkshopReport_20180920_Final.pdf.
aspects raised by implementation at scale, “there has
been no systematic evaluation of the ethics of carbon
removal methods by the climate assessment community
or professional philosophers.” Indeed, some of the rush
to deployment without stopping to take heed of broader
social and ethical considerations may ultimately undermine
the instrumentalist agenda, as seen in backlashes over
past efforts to deploy nuclear power or CCS (Barry, 2016;
Asayama and Ishii, 2017).
(2b) In the dominating strands of GGR research, the way
GGR futures are analyzed as futures is problematic.
Scientists in the UK programme identified analyzing the
deep uncertainty about the future(s) of GGR, in a context
marked by lack of evidence and experience with these
techniques, and uncertainty about the future societal
contexts in which they may be deployed, as another key
challenge. Again disciplinary differences matter, and it is
hard to square a positivist focus on quantified estimates
of error with qualitative understandings of ignorance and
ambiguity (Stirling, 2008).
(3) Finally, the narrow, instrumental frame also tends to
depoliticise GGR research, making many avenues of critical
inquiry invisible, and research on them under-resourced.
Legitimate questions about, for example, how we ended up
proposing GGR in the first place, and how policy makers
and modeling shape GGR research are not asked. Castree
et al. (2014) commenting on Global Environmental Change
research in the Future Earth programme, argued that without
critical scrutiny of the current societal regime, climate research
tends toward supporting the status quo. Castree et al.
(2014) argued for environmental social science that depicts
humans as diverse and often in disagreement—and crucially
work on power, violence, inequality and alternative society-
environment regimes—and an ensuing exploration of a wider
set of means and strategies.
BRINGING HASS FULLY INTO GGR
RESEARCH
We here set out principles for bringing HASS out of sequestration
and into GGR research more fully, which also address the
problems identified above, structured as three themes:
(1) HASS-led GGR research
To address the problem of subsumingHASS research under
one dominating instrumental, techno-economic framing, we
need to consider how GGR research is organized. HASS,
offering rich and diverse theoretical perspectives and cultural
insights, should be considered, respected—and in some cases
lead—in the design of all GGR research. There is a need and
opportunity for engagement across disciplinary boundaries,
and with external stakeholders, and in various forms of
processes and projects, in inter- and transdisciplinary work
(Forster et al., 2020).
Yet there is also a need for HASS research on GGR that is
organized independently from both the current policy agenda,
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and the expectations of natural scientists and engineers.
Independence from policy agendas is valuable not only for
exploring alternative futures, but also for the very immediate
and pragmatic reasons that policy agendas can change, e.g.
after elections. The GGR futures in a 2030 zero-carbon
strategy to progress toward Labour’s Green New Deal would
be different from those implied by a continuation toward
the 2050 net-zero target set by the current Conservative
UK government. Enabling independent HASS GGR research
requires changes to current funding regimes and science
policy. Current climate science funding dramatically under-
supports HASS research (Overland and Sovacool, 2020).
The next two themes are about widening the set of GGR
futures considered, and understanding why they tend to be
narrowed down so much in the first place, respectively.
(2) Opening up GGR futures
(2a) The narrow techno-economic framing of GGR needs
to be challenged, and opened up to a fuller range of disciplines
and perspectives. As a first step, research about GGR framings
is needed, to better understand the problem of it being
narrowed down (Waller et al., 2020).
This would then open up for generation of knowledge
about both descriptive and normative aspects of GGR that
are poorly understood. Minx et al. (2018) point to a dearth
of work on political economy, socio-economic contexts, social
psychology, ethics and innovation processes. To this we might
add aesthetics, spirituality and history. For example, ethics
researchers may address questions like: if all the current and
future generations were placed “behind a veil of ignorance,”
which generation is better or worse off by not taking actions
today with the expectation that GGR techniques can solve this
issue in the future?
And the visions about GGR provided by current policy
makers and experts need to be complemented with others. In a
time as politically turbulent as the current, there is surely need
to prepare for the widest possible range of futures. This theme
requires engagement with a wide range of actors with different
ideas about what the future may hold.
(2b) Research is needed about the current circulation of
GGR visions and promises, and about the processes through
which they direct and shape development trajectories. This
should include research about what assumptions about people,
politics etc. are embedded in current visions for GGR. An
important question is: what ways of relating to the future are
embedded in GGR visions?
Doing research about GGR futures is hard, given the lack
of evidence on their interactions with the environment and
the wider society. We can’t predict the future no matter how
much science we do. And error bars are simply not enough
to account for the deep uncertainties at play in potential
futures. But there are other ways of doing research about
the future/temporalities, which can complement traditional
positivist predictive modes of knowledge production and so
it is necessary to expand the disciplines brought to bear
(Ozawa et al., 2019). The uncertainty of GGR futures is also
compounded by possible interactions with the unfolding of
other climate policy options. This includes social, cultural
etc. interactions.
Sociology of science can contribute to this theme by
exploring how knowledge about GGR is shaped by our
current society. For example, how are current North-South
relations reflected in scientific assumptions about biomass
supply? But also e.g., innovation studies, with its sensitivity to
complexity and open-endedness of innovation processes and
social psychology, which seeks to test the assumptions of how
individuals actually react to stimuli or how they might behave
in simulated futures can help expand our understanding of the
uncertainty inherent in GGR futures.
(3) Politics of GGR futures
To understand why particular ways of framing GGR have
been used, and doing research about it, and why this may be
hard to change, it is necessary to understand the history and
politics of the context of GGR research.
Political economy research can clearly contribute here. It
can go beyond existing research on who would win or lose
out financially from implementing, or not implementing, GGR
by taking into accounts the effects of merely talking about
and developing GGR. Also, how are such interests constituted
and able to shape emerging development trajectories? How are
interests re-constituted by the pursuit of GGR?
This theme also opens up for broader questions about
equity and justice (Pozo et al., in press). What are the
generational, class, gender, race, etc., implications (and
preconditions) of GGR futures, and why have these concerns
not been taken into account (enough)? Under what conditions
can such issues be handled well, and GGR development
reinforcing current inequalities be avoided? And how can
engagement with a wide range of actors help construct GGR
futures that are less oppressive?
The politics of GGR is being (and will be) played out
differently across scales and places. Geographically-informed
studies of politics and justice are also needed in this theme.
Relevant issues relating to North-South relations, race and
class certainly have geographic aspects. And the costs and
benefits of GGR techniques, and even the criteria by which
they are assessed, will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
The overall contribution of GGRs to climate action will be
determined by these choices, expressed through Nationally
Determined Contributions in the Paris process (Honegger and
Reiner, 2018). There is an issue of epistemological justice here:
countries in the global South need to be able draw on, and
help determine the direction of, work in the global North,
where currently most research on GGRs and their governance
currently takes place.
Clearly, a historical perspective is also helpful to understand
how the current predicament came about, and how current
GGR futures originated. This includes then the recent, as well
as longer-term, history of science policy (such as institutional
changes in UK research policy and funding, the narrowly
framed instrumentalities it may support, and the extent to
which it is open to the role of critical enquiry from HASS
research, and whether that is different in other countries). It
also needs to look at the epistemological and policy privilege
accorded to climate modeling in current GGR discourse,
and all other fields contributing to the emerging GGR
research community.
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Finally, HASS research can in these ways help explore new ways
of governing technologies such as GGR, in ways that more fully
take into account what is best for people (and planet).
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